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by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks can lead to contagious effects con-
ditional on the failure of a financial institution. We show that contagion is possible
in the unique equilibrium of the economy and characterize exactly when it may exist.
At the same time, we identify a direction of flow for contagious effects, which provides
a rationale for localized financial panics. Simulations identify the optimal level of in-
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when the probability of bank failure is low, maximal levels of interbank holdings are
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1 Introduction
A commonly held view of financial crises is that they begin locally, in some region, country,
or institution, and subsequently “spread” elsewhere. This process of spread is often referred
to as contagion. What might justify contagion in a rational economy? There are two broad
classes of explanations.
The first class of explanations posits that the adverse information that precipitates a
crisis in one institution also implies adverse information about the other. This view em-
phasizes correlations in underlying value across institutions and Bayes learning by rational
agents. For example, a currency crisis in Thailand may be driven by adverse information
about underlying asset values in South East Asia, which can then apply to other countries
in the region.1
A second type of explanation begins with the observation that financial institutions
are often linked to each other through direct portfolio or balance sheet connections. For
example, entrepreneurs are linked to capitalists through credit relationships; banks are
known to hold interbank deposits. While such balance sheet connections may seem to be
desirable ex ante, during a crisis the failure of one institution can have direct negative payoff
effects upon stakeholders of institutions with which it is linked.2
In this paper, we present a model of financial contagion which formalizes this latter
view. We focus on a particular (but particularly important) type of financial institution:
commercial banks. Throughout history, banks have cross-held deposits (for regulatory and
insurance reasons), and thus the failure of some banks had direct consequences on others
through capital linkages. Contagious bank failure is particularly complex because it involves
an underlying coordination problem amongst depositors of each bank. Even weak banks
may not fail if very few depositors withdraw their money early, while strong banks may fail
if many depositors withdraw early. The existence of multiple equilibria makes it difficult
to examine even individual bank failures, which then compounds the difficulty of isolating
contagious effects in many bank settings.3 Using and extending some recent developments
in the theory of equilibrium selection in coordination games (see Morris and Shin 2000),
we present a model of an economy with multiple banks where the probability of failure of
individual banks, and of systemic crises, is uniquely determined. This then permits us to
1For papers that emphasize this view, see, for example, Kodres and Pritsker (1998), Chen (1999), or
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2002).
2Two leading papers that emphasize this view are Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) and Allen and Gale (2000).
An interesting recent paper which highlights the possibility of contagion through financial links between
stakeholders in different institutions, rather than the institutions themselves, is Goldstein and Pauzner
(2000b). A related explanation, based on a wealth effect, is offered by Kyle and Xiong (2001).
3For the classic multiple equilibrium model of bank runs, see Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
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identify contagion precisely and examine its properties.
The set of financial crises that are best represented by our model are the banking panics
of the National Banking System in the United States. We now provide a brief and stylized
description of these panics.
1.1 National Banking Era Panics
The description presented here selectively synthesises and summarizes the descriptions pro-
vided by Sprague (1910), Wicker (2000), and Calomiris and Gorton (1991). The defining
characteristics of the National Banking System were laid out in the National Banking Act
of 1864. This act prohibited interstate branching of banks and established a system of re-
serve pyramiding, under which country banks could hold reserves in designated reserve city
banks, which in turn could hold reserves in New York. Thus, throughout this period, the
reserve cities including New York directly or indirectly held the deposits of many country
banks. As late as 1907, Sprague (1910, p. 223) points out that: “New York still maintained
its commanding position as a debtor of national banks.”
There were five banking panics of varying intensity in the National Banking Era prior
to the Great Depression. They occurred in 1873, 1884, 1890, 1893, and 1907. With the
exception of the the crisis of 1893, all of these panics began as localized disturbances in
New York and subsequently spread to banks in the interior of the country. What were the
sources of these panics? Calomiris and Gorton (1991) argue persuasively that the panics
typically began with asset-side shocks. Wicker (2000, p. 1) confirms: “In New York, the
banking panics began with an unexpected financial shocks . . . the immediate effect being a
loss of depositor confidence manifest by bank runs that were bank-specific and sometimes
extending to all savings banks.” This was typically followed by suspension of payments by
New York banks, followed by suspensions in banks at various parts of the country.
A particularly good example of such contagious panics was the panic of 1907.4 In 1907,
the panic began due to an unsuccessful attempt to corner the Copper market by a group of
speculators who were associated with several Trust Companies and National Banks in New
York. When news of this speculative failure became public in October there were runs on
Knickerbocker Trust Company. This was followed by runs on the National Bank of North
America and on other institutions thought to be linked to the Copper speculators. While
some attempts were made to ease the crisis by private bankers led by J. P. Morgan, an
unfortunate delay in reaction by the large New York Clearing House led to a widespread
4Sprague (1910) points out that the panic of 1907 was preceded by no systemic shocks that might conflate
our analysis (p. 216): “For our purposes, therefore, we are fortunate in being provided with a crisis which
was preceded by no legislation or monetary conditions unfavorable to sound banking.”
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panic, followed by several suspensions and bank closures. Sprague (1910, p. 259) points
out: “Everywhere the banks suddenly found themselves confronted with demands for money
by frightened depositors . . . Country banks drew money from city banks and all banks
throughout the country demanded the return of funds deposited or on loan in New York.”
Finally, the panic that began with a localized asset shock in New York led to suspensions
(or effective suspensions) through much of the country. In the panic of 1907, therefore, we
find a clear example of how a financial panic may spread along the channels of direct capital
connections between institutions.
To summarize, some of the stylized features of the National Banking System panics are
as follows:
• Panics originated due to asset-side shocks. They were inherently dynamic, starting in
New York and spreading to the interior of the country.
• While other factors may also play a role,5 panics appeared to diffuse nationally through
the correspondent network, from debtor New York banks to creditor banks in the
interior.
In what follows, we develop a dynamic Bayesian game theoretic model in which many of
these stylized features emerge in equilibrium.
1.2 Summary of Model and Results
We consider a 3-period economy with two non-overlapping regions, each with a represen-
tative competitive bank. Regional banks have access to a storage technology (cash) and
a region-specific risky technology that pays a higher expected return than cash if held to
maturity, but pays less than par value if liquidated early. The return on the risky asset is re-
vealed in period three, and is an increasing function of uniformly distributed region-specific
underlying fundamentals.
There are two continuums of risk-averse consumers, one in each region, each of whom
lives three periods. The consumers receive private liquidity shocks: with some probability
they may need to consume in period one. They begin life with their endowments deposited
in the representative bank of their region. The aggregate level of liquidity demand in the
economy is fixed, but the two regions may experience negatively correlated regional shocks.
The two representative banks insure against such regional liquidity shocks by holding inter-
5Wicker (2000) identifies four channels of transmission from New York to the interior, including diffusion
via the correspondent network. However, not all of these factors are independent, and at least two of these
may formally reduce to consequences of existing correspondent relationships.
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bank deposits. Consumer deposits, as well as interbank deposits take the form of standard
demand deposit contracts.
Within period one, regional liquidity shocks are realized first and become public knowl-
edge. Then, nature selects the depositors of one of the banks to receive private signals
about their bank’s fundamentals and make their choices. The depositors of the other bank
observe the net proportion of the depositors of the first bank who withdraw their money.
Shortly thereafter, the depositors of the other bank receive private information about their
bank’s fundamentals, and decide whether to remain or withdraw.6 The seniority of inter-
bank deposits implies that when the depositors of either bank are called upon to make their
choices, there is an interim asymmetry between the two banks: one bank (in the region
with high initial liquidity demand) is a net debtor to the other bank.
Under weak assumptions on the distribution of fundamentals, we prove that there is a
unique threshold in asset returns below which each bank will fail (Propositions 1, 2, 3, and
4). Bank failure thus depends upon the release of adverse information, and the probability
of failure is determined endogenously. In our central result, we show that contagion exists:
that is, there are regions of fundamentals in which one bank fails if and only if the other
bank fails (Proposition 5). Conditional on the failure of the debtor bank, the creditor bank
fails for a wider range of its own fundamentals than if the debtor bank survived. However,
the failure of the creditor bank does not affect the probability of failure of the debtor bank.
Contagion flows from debtors to creditors, and thus spreads along the channels of interbank
deposits in a specific direction. Hence, contagion can be localized and not all institutions
become potential targets.
Interbank deposits enable banks to hedge regional liquidity shocks, but expose them to
the risk of contagion. We illustrate the conditions under which banks would want to hold
significant levels of interbank deposits. Intuition suggests and our simulations confirm that
when banks runs are rare, financial institutions will insure fully against regional liquidity
demand shocks. However, when bank runs are frequent, only partial insurance will be
optimal.
Finally, under the assumption of full liquidity insurance, we present comparative statics
results to demonstrate that contagion is increasing in the size of regional liquidity demand
6There are two natural ways to interpret this non-simultaneity in the model, of which we prefer the
second. One can think of this model as a discrete approximation of a continuous time model with generically
staggered release of information. One can also think of this as a genuine discrete time setting in which (for
reasons we do not model) the depositors of one bank suddenly receive information and choose to act. The
depositors of the other bank (in another region) learn about the events in the first bank the following day,
and then actively seek out information about their own bank immediately thereafter, and choose whether
to withdraw or remain.
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shocks (Proposition 6). This is a testable implication of the model.
1.3 Related Literature
Our paper is connected with a diverse literature. We apply the equilibrium selection tech-
niques summarized in Morris and Shin (2000). Goldstein and Pauzner (2000a) were the
first to apply these techniques to the analysis of bank runs. Our model shares features with
theirs.7 They investigate the probability of bank runs in a single-bank setting, while we are
interested in the problem of contagion with multiple banks. Rochet and Vives (2000) also
analyze bank runs using similar techniques, but do not concern themselves with the problem
of contagion. Goldstein and Pauzner (2000b), like us, examine contagion of self-fulfilling
crises, but their mechanism for contagion (through common lenders) is different from ours.
Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) explore the method by which contagion flows through credit
chains amongst lenders and entrepreneurs. Their model shares with ours the feature that
capital connections are the channels for contagion, but does not concern itself with coordi-
nation problems. Rochet and Tirole (1996) examine correlated bank failures via monitoring:
the failure of one bank is assumed to mean that other banks have not been monitored, and
thus triggers multiple collapses.
The paper that comes closest to us in theme is by Allen and Gale (2000). Their purpose
is to model contagion as an equilibrium phenomenon in a many-bank setting. While our
model contains features of Allen and Gale’s framework, there are important differences.
Allen and Gale work with perfect information and bank panics occur due to aggregate
(random) liquidity shocks on the part of the depositors. Such aggregate liquidity shocks are
necessary and sufficient for contagion. Our model features incomplete information. Bank
runs occur due to adverse information about asset returns. Regional liquidity shocks are
necessary but not sufficient for contagion.
The existence of contagion in Allen and Gale (2000) requires incompleteness in the
interbank deposit market. This may suggest that complete interbank deposits may eliminate
contagion, thus reducing the need for a lender of last resort. Our model suggests, however,
that contagion occurs with positive probability even with complete interbank deposits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present the model.
In section 3 we prove the existence and uniqueness of threshold equilibria. Section 4 contains
our central result. The optimal level of interbank deposit holdings is illustrated numerically
in Section 5. Section 6 provides closed forms and comparative statics. Section 7 discusses
and concludes.
7Importantly, in both models, payoffs fail to satisfy global strategic complementarities.
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2 The Model
2.1 Regional Liquidity Shocks
We consider an economy with two non-overlapping “regions,” A and B. There are three
time periods t = 0, 1, 2. The regions are populated by distinct continuums of weakly risk
averse agents with utility functions u(·) [u′(·) > 0, u′′(·) ≤ 0] who each live for three peri-
ods. Each agent has an endowment of 1 unit. Agents face private (uninsurable) liquidity
shocks: they need either to consume in period 1 (impatient) or in period 2 (patient). In
the aggregate, there is no uncertainty about liquidity in the economy: there is exactly a
proportion w ∈ (0, 1) of agents who require early liquidity. However, individual regions
experience (regionally) aggregate liquidity shocks of size x > 0. In particular, there are two
states of the world: λ = A or λ = B, corresponding to the cases where region A and region
B have high early liquidity demands respectively. Since aggregate liquidity is constant, re-
gional liquidity shocks are negatively correlated. The state λ is realized and publicly known
A B
λ = A w + x w − x
λ = B w − x w + x
Table 1: Regional Liquidity Shocks
immediately at the beginning of period 1. States A and B occur with equal probability.
2.2 Banks, Demand Deposits, and Interbank Insurance
We consider two symmetric (representative, competitive) banks which lie in two regions
of the economy. Agents begin their lives with their endowments deposited in the bank
of their region.8 There are two classes of assets available to banks: a safe and liquid
storage technology with a low (unit) gross rate of return, and a risky, illiquid asset with
high expected return but with costs to premature liquidation. The storage technology is
common to both banks. One unit stored at time t produces one unit at time t + 1. In
addition, region i’s residents also have access to risky illiquid technology Ri, with returns
8While we thus assume participation in the banking system, it shall become clear below (See section 5)
that this assumption can be justified in equilibrium by choosing free parameters L and U to make bank runs
rare. As bank runs become sufficiently rare, it shall always be optimal for risk averse depositors to deposit
their endowment in banks.
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given by:
Ri(t) =
{
0 < r < 1 when t = 1,
R(θi) when t = 2, where θi is distributed uniform on [L,U ]
where t is the time of liquidation, R(·) is any increasing function. The parameter θi in-
dexes some underlying “fundamentals” related to the bank’s assets, which determine the
level of the bank’s asset returns. These fundamentals θi are independent and identically
distributed for i = A,B. We assume that Eθi [u(R(θi))] ≥ u(1), i.e., the risky asset pays a
higher expected return if held till period 2.
Banks are constrained to offer depositors demand deposit contracts.9 Demand deposit
contracts offer conversion of deposits into cash at par on demand in period 1 conditional on
sufficient cash being available. If, however, sufficient cash is not available, then the contract
specifies that the bank will divide up evenly what cash it can generate by liquidating its
portfolio amongst the depositors who demand early withdrawal. At this point of time, the
bank goes out of business. For those depositors who choose to remain in the bank till period
2, the bank promises to pay a stochastic amount, which is contingent upon the returns on
the bank’s assets, the proportion of early withdrawals, and payouts to any senior liabilities.
The two banks face aggregate demand shocks in period 1, in keeping with the regionally
aggregate liquidity shocks outlined above. However, since these aggregate regional liquidity
shocks are negatively correlated, banks insure against these by holding interbank deposits.10
In particular, we assume that banks hold cash reserves equal to w, the average level of
liquidity demand in the economy, and insure against regional liquidity shocks by holding
interbank deposits of size D ∈ [0, x] with the other bank.11 Thus, in this symmetric scheme,
banks exchange deposits of size D,12 and distribute their net wealth of 1, putting w in cash,
9Hence we are not solving here for the optimal contractual form. Demand deposit contracts are a
standard feature of banking systems and we take them as given. For theoretical justification of demand
deposit contracts, see Calomiris and Kahn (1991) or Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
10We are implicitly assuming that banks have access to only interbank deposits as a tool to insure, and
hence can insure only against shocks to their liabilities. While this assumption is not central to our analysis,
we assume it for algebraic simplicity as well as to eliminate correlation between the bank’s asset returns.
Such correlation would introduce a second channel of contagion, through learning. Our purpose in this paper
to explore the extent to which capital connections, by themselves can contribute to contagion.
11Given the cash holdings of the banks, and given the timing of the model to be explicated below, interbank
deposits of size larger than x will not be desirable to banks. Such deposits would leave banks unable to
pay their own early consumers in any equilibrium without prematurely liquidating some of their long term
assets. In practice, there were often regulatory restrictions on the size of D.
12One can think of this as the banking system entering into an implicit liquidity insurance scheme ex ante
– no money physically needs to be exchanged in Period 0
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and 1− w in long term investment projects. The size of interbank deposits, D, is a choice
variable for banks. In equilibrium, D shall depend on the parameters of the model.
These interbank deposits have the feature that in each period they “clear before” claims
to individual depositors are paid. In other words, as soon as the state A or B is realized at
the beginning of period 1, the bank in the high liquidity demand region receives a payment
of D from the bank in the other region, before individual depositors can claim money from
the bank. Similarly, in period 2, the banks use any proceeds of liquidated investments to
first pay their fellow bankers, and then pay their patient depositors out of the remaining
proceeds.13 It is helpful to consider an example.
Suppose that only impatient agents withdraw money in period 1 and that D = x. In
addition, suppose state A is realized, so that regionA has a higher immediate liquidity shock.
Upon the realization of the state, bank A immediately receives from bank B its deposit of
x, so that bank A now has w+x in cash, which matches the amount of withdrawals it faces.
Similarly, bank B now has w−x in cash, which is precisely the demand it faces in period 1.
Bank A now owes bank B the amount xR(θA), and owes its own customers (w − x)R(θA).
But it has exactly (1−w) invested in the illiquid asset R(θA), so its proceeds in period 2 are
(1 − w)R(θA), which is exactly the sum of its liabilities. Similarly, promises and earnings
clear for bank B.
2.3 Information and Timing
In period 1 nature selects at random (and with equal probability) one of the sets of depositors
to receive information about their bank and to act. Information is received in the form of
private signals about the underlying fundamentals of their bank. Suppose region i is selected
first. Depositor j of region i receives signal θj,i = θi+j,i, where j,i are distributed uniformly
in the population on [−, ]. Shortly thereafter, the depositors of the other bank (in region
−i) receive information about their own bank, and get to act themselves. The information
structure is symmetric. Depositor j of region −i receives signal θj,−i = θ−i + j,−i, where
j,−i are distributed uniformly in the population on [−, ]. Importantly, before choosing,
the depositors who move second learn what happened in the first bank. Thus, the timing
of this game can be described shown below in itemized form:
• Period 0
– Interbank deposits are initiated.
13Note that the assumed priority order for clearing is an innocuous assumption: giving interbank payments
priority minimizes contagion at the cost of increasing the probability of bank runs in debtor institutions.
Since the goal of this exercise is to show that contagion is an essential element of interconnected banking
systems, this assumption acutally works against us.
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• Period 1
– State A or B is realized.
– Period 1 interbank claims settle.
– Depositors in bank i receive information and choose actions.
– Depositors of bank i who demand early withdrawal are paid.
– Depositors in bank −i receive information and choose actions.
– Depositors in bank −i who demand early withdrawal are paid.
• Period 2
– Period 2 interbank claims settle.
– Residual depositor claims on the two banks settle.
2.4 Depositor Payoffs and Interbank Payments
We are now ready to write down the payoffs to depositors in this game. In period 1, de-
positors choose whether to demand conversion of their deposits into cash at par (withdraw)
or to retain their deposits with the bank (remain). Impatient depositors can only consume
in period 1. They will therefore always withdraw. However, the patient depositors face a
non-trivial decision problem. We explicate their payoffs below.
Recall that in period 1 one bank will be a debtor and one bank will be a creditor. Thus,
without loss of generality, we can label the payoff matrices for the patient depositors of the
two banks as those of the debtor bank and the creditor bank respectively.
Begin by considering the debtor bank, i.e. the bank that experienced a high liquidity
shock in period 1. There is a mass 1− (w+x) of patient agents in the debtor region. Let nd
represent the proportion of the patient depositors who choose to withdraw in period 1. If nd
proportion of patient depositors withdraw, then, since impatient agents (of measure w+ x)
always withdraw in period 1, total demand for cash in period 1 is (w+x)+nd(1− (w+x)).
The bank had w in cash and received D in cash from the creditor bank at the beginning of
period 1 (and hence became a debtor to the creditor bank). Thus, its total cash holdings
are w+D. If demand for cash exceeds w+D, the bank can obtain more cash by liquidating
its long assets. It has 1−w invested in the long asset, from which it can generate (1−w)r
in cash in period 1. Thus, observe that if [w + x] + (1− [w + x])nd ≥ [w +D] + (1− w)r,
i.e., if
nd ≥ (1− w)r +D − x1− (w + x) (1)
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then the debtor bank becomes insolvent and goes out of business in period 1, and in the pro-
cess divides up the proceeds of its liquidated asset portfolio equally amongst its claimants
in period 1. However, if the bank remains solvent in period 1, then it must first settle
its debt of DR(θi) to the creditor bank (because interbank deposits have seniority, within
each period, to regular demand deposits). In order to pay early demands by patient agents
in period 1, the debtor bank had to liquidate (1−w−x)nd+(x−D)r of the illiquid asset in pe-
riod 1. Its original investment in the long asset was 1 − w. The remaining proceeds
are (1 − w − (1−(w+x))nd+(x−D)r )R(θi). As long as (1 − w − (1−(w+x))nd+(x−D)r )R(θi) >
DR(θi) (i.e., nd <
(1−w)r+(D−x)−rD
1−w−x ), the debtor bank pays DR(θi) to the creditor bank
in period 2, and divides up the remainder equally amongst its residual depositors who
chose to remain in the bank. This means that each patient depositor who chooses to
remain receives 1−w−
(1−(w+x))nd+(x−D)
r
−D
(1−w−x)(1−nd) R(θi). However, if nd ≥
(1−w)r+(D−x)−rD
1−w−x , resid-
ual depositors receive nothing, and the creditor bank receives (due to seniority) (1 − w −
(1−(w+x))nd+(x−D)
r )R(θi). Thus, the period 2 payments on the interbank deposits from the
debtor to the creditor bank can be written as:
g(θi, nd) =

DR(θi) if nd <
(1−w)r+(D−x)−rD
1−w−x
(1− w − (1−(w+x))nd+(x−D)r )R(θi) if (1−w)r+(D−x)−rD1−w−x ≤ nd < (1−w)r+(D−x)1−(w+x)
0 if nd ≥ (1−w)r+(D−x)1−(w+x)
Correspondingly, the payoffs to the patient depositors, if they withdraw, are given by:
uW (θi, nd) =
{
u[1] if nd <
(1−w)r+(D−x)
1−(w+x)
u[ (w+D)+(1−w)r(w+x)+(1−(w+x))nd ] if nd ≥
(1−w)r+(D−x)
1−(w+x)
And if they remain:
uR(θi, nd) =
 u[1−w−
(1−(w+x))nd+(x−D)
r
−D
(1−w−x)(1−nd) R(θi)] if nd <
(1−w)r+(D−x)−rD
1−w−x
u[0] if nd ≥ (1−w)r+(D−x)−rD1−w−x
Now consider the payoffs to the depositors of the creditor bank. Observe that the creditor
bank’s payoffs are complicated by the fact that they depend on the condition of the debtor
bank. If the debtor bank were to become insolvent in period 1 (i.e. condition (1) holds),
then the creditor bank receives no money from the debtor bank in period 2, and has to
divide up a smaller pool of proceeds amongst its residual claimants. However, regardless
of the condition of the debtor bank, the creditor bank may itself be run out of business.
Let nc denote the proportion of the patient depositors of the creditor bank who choose to
withdraw in period 1. Observe that if
nc ≥ (1− w)r + (x−D)1− (w − x) (2)
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